However, better technology alone may not increase farm productivity. There is often a gap between available knowledge and what farmers actually do. They need to know about the costs and benefits of new technology before they adopt it. The public sector is often involved in spreading the knowledge. What is the rationale for its doing so? Information on new farming technology is often a public good, since the provider of information to one user cannot stop other users from getting it without charge, and the value of the information is not affected by the number of users. Information that is more specialized and specific is less of a public good, so could be provided by private entrepreneurs. Indeed, commercial agents dealing with certain types of information such as pest control may operate alongside a public agency providing more general information (Hall 1977) . And they may have an incentive to tell farmers about new technology that is embodied in the supplies they are selling. In general, however, farming information has enough public-good qualities to justify public sector involvement in its dissemination.
Farmers obtain most of their information from each other. The time and resources they devote to acquiring it vary considerably. Also, a farmer does not consider the potential benefits to others when he decides how much information to obtain. It follows that, from a social point of view, farmers tend to underinvest in information acquisition. The availability of public sources of information tends to lower the cost of acquiring it for all farmers, and thereby increases social welfare if the cost of the public program is not too high (Feder and Slade 1984a) .
The main public channel for spreading agricultural knowledge is usually the extension service. Public spending on agricultural extension is large. Judd, Boyce, and Evenson (1983) estimate that it totaled $3.5 billion worldwide in 1980. In 1974-84, investment in agricultural extension in projects financed by the World Bank was $2.3 billion. However, many analysts doubt that extension services can bring the big increases in agricultural productivity promised by the growing quantity of new or modified technology emerging from agricultural research institutions.
Extension services in developing countries are often criticized for: (a) lack of staff training and incentives and channels for updating agents' knowledge; (b) inefficient organizational structures that prevent adequate supervision of field workers; (c) requirements for staff to perform tasks other than spreading information, such as collecting data; (d) staff shortages; (e) absence of organized feedback about farmer problems from fieldworkers to researchers. Accordingly, agencies have been paying more attention to improving the management and efficiency of extension systems. One result has been the Training and Visit (T&v) extension system (described in Benor and Baxter 1984) . T&V was originally tested in Turkey in the late 1960s. It has been introduced during the past ten years in more than forty developing countries, in many cases as nationwide systems, and often with the assistance of the World Bank. It has been most widely adopted since 1977 in India, replacing the system of multipurpose village-level workers.
With T&V, staff deal exclusively with extension work. They are organized in a single line of command, so at each rank an officer has few enough staff under him to allow effective and personal guidance, supervision, and training. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the village extension workers (VEWS). They usually cover areas containing 700-800 farming families, divided into about eight groups. In each group, about 10 percent are chosen as "contact farmers." The VEW visits each of the eight farmers' groups once every two weeks, on a specified day. These visits mostly take place in the fields of contact farmers, but other farmers are expected to participate. Occasionally, the VEW may organize a large group meeting, but most of his contacts are with small groups or individuals. The fixed schedule of visits helps the VEW's superiors to supervise his work and also encourages interest and confidence among farmers.
To be effective, the T&V system aims to focus advice on the main crops grown and the most important farming methods. Simple methods that do not need money are promoted first, so that all farmers can benefit. Contact farmers are expected to adopt (or at least try) recommended practices and transmit them to other farmers. Because T&V involves a high ratio of extension workers to farmers, it is relatively expensive. Much research has already been done on T&V (see, for example, Cernea 1981; Howell 1982a Howell , 1982b Howell , 1983 Howell , 1984 von Blanckenburg 1982; Jaiswal 1983; Singh 1983; Moore 1984) . Their opinions vary. Some observers argue that intensive personal contact between farmers and extension agents is unnecessarily expensive and that good results could be obtained by using written materials and the media. In many countries the mass media supplement direct contacts between farmers and extension workers (Perraton 1983) . In some areas, they are the main form of diffusing public information. However, advocates of personal contact argue that the media do not give a fast feedback from farmers, nor can they adequately tailor their advice to local circumstances. Other skeptics of T&V argue that it is undesirable to separate advisory work from the supply of inputs. The counterargument is that the provision of inputs will tend to dominate the agents' activities; fieldworkers should, however, coordinate their advice with the suppliers of inputs.
Other criticisms of T&V are (a) that it is hard to implement in areas of extensive agriculture, because it requires well-organized farmers' groups and frequent personal contact; and (b) that T&V iS biased toward wealthier farmers. These arguments are seldom informed by suitable empirical evidence. Few authors, therefore, fail to mention the need for objective empirical information with which the effects of T&V can be assessed. This paper assesses those effects by using farm survey data from India. First, it reviews the sources of data, then goes on to compare the importance of different channels for informing farmers about new or improved farming methods. The next section examines the characteristics of contact farmers, and the biases inherent in their selection. The following section analyzes the frequency with which contact and noncontact farmers are reached by extension and some of the factors that determine these frequencies. The paper then looks at the effect of T&V on farmers' knowledge. Subsequently, an econometric estimation of the impact of T&V on farm productivity is undertaken. Conclusions follow a cost-benefit analysis of T&V.
Empirical
This paper draws on two main sources of data. . The data in this study do not allow conclusive assessment of the relative merits of T&V extension and those methods based on the mass media. Neither can they illustrate the potential of T&V in areas of extensive agriculture, because Indian conditions are different.
T&V
To assess the various channels of spreading information, it is useful Operations to review how farmers rank them. Table 1 shows that contact farmers consider extension to be their primary source of information. A signi- Note: Data are ratios of the number of times a VEW is cited as the main source of information to the number of times that "other farmers" is cited. Less expensive practices include choice of seed variety, seeding rate, and spacing; more expensive practices include use of phosphate, potash, and zinc, seed treatment against termites and disease, and timing of nitrogen fertilizer application.
Source : Feder, Slade, and Sundaram 1986. low rate of literacy (35 percent). However, even in an area of high literacy (and very thin extension services) in Thailand, farmers used the radio much more than written sources (Hutanuwatr and others 1982) . These findings highlight the importance of communication among farmers. They also explain why several extension systems concentrate on a relatively small number of farmers, who are expected to transmit information to the rest. The choice of information source tends to be affected by the complexity or cost of the farming methods being learned. Many farmers regard firsthand or specialized information sources as more accurate and reliable Slade 1986, Howell 1984) . Table 2 compares the ratio of farmers who have learned complex or expensive practices from extension agents (firsthand source) to that of farmers who have learned from other farmers (secondhand source). The message is clear: the easier it is to consult extension agents, the more likely they are to be the source of information. And irrespective of extension availability, the more complex or risky practices tend to be learned more often from extension. When spreading the more complex methods of farming, therefore, agents should try to maximize their direct contact with farmers.
Characteristics
Contact farmers receive a direct and regular flow of information of Contact from extension agents, so their selection is a matter of considerable Contact farmers must be willing to try out practices recommended by the extension workers and be prepared to have other farmers visit their fields. But they should not be the community's more progressive farmers who are usually regarded as exceptional and their neighbors tend not to follow them. On the other hand, very weak farmers tend to be slow in adopting new methods. Furthermore, the contact farmers must be of good standing in their community so that their views on new practices will be respected by other farmers (Benor and Harrison 1977, pp. 13, 14) .
Evidence suggests that there is a large overlap between the qualities of "opinion leaders" and those of "innovators," or fast adopters (Kilvin and others 1971) . Traditionally, extension workers have tended to concentrate on the well-to-do farmers, because their efforts were more likely to produce an immediate and visible impact and because wealthier farmers could offer them personal benefits (meals, accommodation, produce). This bias has often been noted in the literature (Chambers 1976 , Cernea 1981 , and von Blanckenburg 1982 . Some studies have argued that, on efficiency grounds, scarce extension re- Significant at 5 percent (one-tailed) level of significance. Significant at 7 percent (one-tailed) level of significance. Note: The results in this table were obtained from a logit analysis in which the probability of a farmer's being selected as a contact farmer is related to socioeconomic explanatory variables. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t values.
a. No estimate of the constant is presented; the sample is not random with respect to the proportions of contact and noncontact farmers, and the estimated constant is therefore biased. The other coefficients are not affected, however (McFadden, personal communication) .
Source : Feder and Slade 1984b. sources should be used to greatest effect-implying a focus on larger, and usually richer, farmers (Welch 1979) . However, this bias has disadvantages as well. Smaller and poorer farmers may not be convinced that the new practices are better: to them, a better performance by contact farmers could simply reflect the latter's greater wealth.
There are other complications as well. Extension workers are responsible for choosing contact farmers in their area, and personal preferences cannot be eliminated. As in many extension systems, agents tend to favor the wealthy and influential, even if they are not suitable as communicators of innovations. It is sometimes necessary to avoid antagonizing such powerful individuals, who may otherwise make extension work difficult to carry out. Furthermore, the choice of contact farmers will vary according to how far agents understand the extension system and how well they have been trained. Hoeper (1983) has shown that the selection of contact farmers varies considerably. In a study on India, Feder and Slade (1984b) found that the caste composition of two groups of contact and noncontact farmers was almost identical, but that the farmers chosen as contacts tended to be wealthier, more educated, with better irrigation facilities, and of higher social status (see Table 3 ). However, although farmers owning less than two acres were underrepresented in the contact group their share was not negligible-12 percent-compared with 30 percent in the general population.
Relations
The links between extension workers and contact farmers can be with Farmers regarded as the "supply" of extension services, because the T&V system requires these services to be provided regularly to contact farmers. Contact farmers, in turn, are expected to pass on this information to noncontact farmers. Moreover, it is not imperative that noncontact farmers have regular visits from extension workers; thus, the interaction between noncontact farmers and extension agents is likely to be determined by "demand" from noncontact farmers. However, the extension agents are expected to accommodate requests for information from all farmers. It is also expected that noncontact farmers will attend some meetings between extension agents and contact farmers. Some idea of the frequency of agents' visits to contact and noncontact farmers can be gleaned from Table 4 , drawn from the reports of monitoring and evaluation surveys from seven states in India over several seasons. The reference period for visit frequencies is one month. But it is possible that noncontact farmers, since they do not receive regular visits, had a longer time horizon in mind, so the data may overstate the frequency of visits.
The critical indicator is the percentage of farmers who report not seeing an extension agent. For contact farmers, this ranges from 1.2 to 34.7 percent; for noncontact farmers, from 21.4 to 59.2 percent. Across all seven states, the average percentage of "no-visits" reported by contact farmers is 15.4 percent (that is, about 85 percent of contact farmers were visited at least once in the reference month); 34.5 percent of the noncontact farmers reported no visits. Considering that some share of no-visits must be due to "normal friction" (Feder and Slade 1984a )-illness of extension workers, vacant posts, and unavailability of contact farmers-the actual supply of T&V services seems adequate relative to the potential supply.
The demand for extension services (measured by noncontact farmers' interaction with agents) is significantly lower than the supply (measured by agents' visits to contact farmers). However, there is not necessarily much unused capacity, since the actual supply available to noncontact farmers must be less than that to contact farmers. Furthermore, the demand for extension services is far higher in a T&V area: data for the Kairana area, which is not covered by T&V, show that between 89 and 97 percent of the farmers were not visited by (or did not seek out) the extension worker during the reference period (Feder and Slade 1986) . In non-T&V areas, no distinction can be drawn between contact and noncontact farmers, so the Kairana figures could be the result of either low demand or low supply. It is known, however, that the ratio of extension workers to farmers is lower in non-T&v areas and that agents there have many duties other than extension. The small supply of extension in non-T&V areas could therefore increase the cost to the farmer of acquiring information from extension, thus reducing the contact between farmers and extension workers. Table 5 summarizes data on visits and no-visits by farm size. Among both contact and noncontact farmers, there is a remarkable similarity between large and small farms. Among contact farmers, 15.9 percent of the small farms and 14.5 percent of the large farms were not visited, a difference of 1.4 percentage points. For noncontact farmers, the difference was only 3.2 points. While these differences are statistically significant at the 99 percent level (see Table 5 ), their size indicates that the bias toward large farmers is not enough to warrant serious concern. Further evidence comes from Feder and Slade (1984b) , showing that "area of land owned" has a positive but not significant effect on the probability that a contact farmer would be visited. Since the links between noncontact farmers and extension workers are probably demand-driven, the difference between large and small farmers may merely indicate-as predicted by theory (Feder and Slade 1984a )-the tendency of larger farmers to invest more in gathering information.
Extension workers may visit farmers more often in the dry season. Data for both contact and noncontact farmers show that the inci- ..
.. = not available Significant at 5 percent level of significance. Note: Small farms were defined as less than 5.1 hectares in Haryana and Gujarat; 4.1 hectares in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka; 3.1 hectares in Madhya Pradesh and Bihar; and 2.1 hectares in Assam.
Source : Feder, Slade, and Sundaram 1986. dence of no-visits during the dry season is significantly lower than in the rainy season, although the absolute difference is small. This result is consistent with Feder and Slade (1986) , who show that the rate at which knowledge spreads tends to be higher for dry-season crops. These findings support the proposition that extension workers play a greater role in the dry season, although the cause may have more to do with the available technology and the riskiness of rainfed agriculture than with the efficiency of the extension system. As experience with the T&V system increases, so the pattern of extension visits changes. The proportion of contact farmers not visit- Note: Data are based on evidence from large sample surveys conducted by monitoring and evaluation units; states, years, and seasons as in Table 4 .
Source : Feder, Slade, and Sundaram 1986. ed goes up significantly: among projects that are four or more years old, nearly one in five contact farmers was not visited (see Table 6 and Figure 1 ). This may be partly due to extension workers' replacing some contact farmers with others but not telling the former of the change. Conversely, the proportion of noncontact farmers not visited declines, from about 48 to 36 finding is that the proportion
Project life (years)
of all farmers visited increases as projects mature. In short, although the T&V system is not without flaws, it does reach the majority of contact farmers regularly and, less regularly, a substantial proportion of noncontact farmers as well. Furthermore, the data do not support the contention that T&V has atrophied, leaving an empty structure and no change in extension operations (Jaiswal 1983 ). In the state of Haryana, even in unsettled times,' T&V still seemed to work better than the traditional system in neighboring Uttar Pradesh. Moore (1984) , Jaiswal (1983) and other commentators have claimed that, in many parts of India covered by T&V, farmers see little benefit in the reformed system; that workers are not known to their clients; and that contact farmers fail to pass on information to others (and Note: Data are based on monitoring and evaluation reports of state governments in India; states, years, and seasons as in Table 4 .
Source : Feder, Slade, and Sundaram 1986. may not even know that they are contact farmers). The data for the study area in Haryana do not support these contentions. From an original sample of 192 contact farmers selected at random from the extension lists in Karnal district, 175 turned out, on their own admission, to be contact farmers. Most of the others said they had been contact farmers in the recent past. All farmers in the sample surveys in Karnal and Kairana were asked in 1983 if they had seen changes in the style of the extension system during the previous few seasons. Predictably, farmers in the Kairana area of Uttar Pradesh saw no change, as none had taken place.
2 In Karnal (where T&V was introduced in 1979) almost all contact farmers were aware of a change in extension operations, and they thought the change beneficial. Among noncontact farmers, less than half had noticed a change, but most of those who did were favorably impressed. This relative lack of awareness of the change among noncontact farmers, particularly on small farms, suggests that earlier efforts to publicize the availability of extension advice had been inadequate. Almost all contact farmers and about half of the others knew the extension worker who visited their group. The comparable proportion for the non-T&V area (Kairana) was little more than one-tenth. Similarly, 60 percent of noncontact farmers reported knowing at least one contact farmer in their area. More than half of all contact farmers claimed to have discussed extension advice with other farmers, while more than 30 percent of those noncontact farmers who had talked to extension workers also claimed to have passed on information obtained from them.
T&V Effects
Extension aims to increase farmers' knowledge about crops and on Farmers' cropping practices, obviously in the hope that additional knowledge Knowledge will lead to improved husbandry and thence to increased agricultural productivity. However, many other factors affect the adoption of technology and output, and they cannot easily be disentangled from extension (as will be discussed in the next section). This section compares the levels of knowledge (thus largely avoiding such complications) among different groups of farmers, drawing on data from the sample surveys in Karnal (T&v area) and Kairana (non-T&v) during the rainy and dry seasons of 1982-83. The data show that for most practices not involving specialized technical knowledge or major expense, contact farmers under the T&V system learned mostly from the extension service. Noncontact farmers learned mostly from other farmers, including contact farmers. Where specialized technical knowledge was involved, all farmers tended to learn from knowledgeable primary sources, such as extension agents. This pattern suggests that the spread of knowledge about the more demanding practices is likely to be much faster in an area such as Karnal, which has ample extension staff, than in a less well-endowed area such as Kairana.
During the sample surveys, farmers were also questioned about their knowledge of specific practices and when they first learned them. Knowledge is difficult to measure without a thorough examination of a respondent's understanding. For some practices this was possible; for others, detailed testing was beyond the time and resources available. In such cases, however, it was possible to establish the farmers' awareness of a particular practice; a farmer who is unaware of a practice cannot, by definition, be familiar with its detail. The resulting data show the growth in the number of farmers who were aware of different technologies in 1978, the year before T&V extension was introduced in Haryana, and four years later. To increase the validity of comparisons between Karnal and Kairana, contact farmers in Karnal have been excluded from the analysis because they receive a disproportionate amount of extension advice and may also be different in other ways (as discussed earlier).
The analysis employed two alternative standard specifications (lo-gistic and negative exponential) of the time path of growth in the spread of knowledge. 3 The results showed that among ten practices for high yielding varieties (HYV) of paddy, 4 the rate of growth in farmer knowledge was clearly faster in Karnal for only three of them. For two paddy practices, knowledge spread faster in Kairana. It is noteworthy, however, that two of the three practices that spread faster in Karnal involved considerable technical content and needed cash inputs. These results are consistent with the argument that such practices are most commonly learned directly from extension agents. Where HYV wheat was concerned, knowledge spread faster in Karnal for nine out of the ten practices examined. These are interesting results, but they must be qualified. First, they are based on sample surveys, and all such surveys have a margin of error. Second, even when knowledge about a practice has increased, it may not be useful or profitable to farmers. Consequently, these results do not prove whether gains in yields result from the observed increases in knowledge or whether such gains outweigh the increased costs of T&V extension. These issues are discussed later.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that T&V extension in Karnal speeded up the spread of knowledge for almost all recommended practices for HYV wheat and several important practices for HYV rice. Such results are consistent with Karnal's significantly greater extension activity. They are also consistent with other survey findings that knowledge spreads faster among contact than noncontact farmers. As this article has already shown, contact farmers have more direct links with extension workers and should therefore (other things being equal) be more knowledgeable. However, as the contact group is not necessarily representative of all farmers, its superior knowledge may be the result of other factors.
The process by which extension affects crop yields involves many Information variables. If extension efforts are successful, however, this success Sources and must eventually result in increased output per unit of input, reduced Farm costs per unit of output, or both.
.o *i. Since the contact point between the extension system and the farmer is the village extension worker, it is essential that the VEW is "better" than other sources of information. A testable hypothesis is therefore implied: other things being equal, farmers whose main information source is the extension worker will have higher productivity or yields than those who rely on other sources. Of course, there may be some systematic relationship between farmers who use extension as a main source of information and their other inherent attributes (such as intelligence) which make them better farmers who obtain higher yields.
Drawing again on the state M&E reports in India, we use data on crop yields in the rainy and dry seasons classified by information source. For the rainy season, we use paddy yields; for the dry season, wheat (under both irrigated and unirrigated conditions). State average yields were calculated by applying weights based on the sample sizes for irrigated and unirrigated farms and for contact and noncontact farmers. The resulting overall average for each state was set equal to 100. Each subset of yields was then expressed as an index number relative to the state average. This conversion permits paddy and wheat yields to be compared (since they differ in absolute magnitudes) and minimizes differences in agroclimatic and socioeconomic factors between states. The net result is a series of index numbers that are comparable across states, crops, and cropping seasons. Table 7 summarizes the data for irrigated, unirrigated, and all farms, classified by main source of farmer information.
Farmers whose main source of information is the VEW have the highest yield index of 114.5. This is followed by those whose source is other farmers; their yield index is close to the average. Other sources (such as radio, demonstration days, sales personnel) have a lower yield index of 95.77. Farmers who receive "no advice" had an index of only 86.11. Those using extension workers as the main source of information seem to have yields that differ substantially from all other sources, but the difference between those using other farmers and other sources is much smaller. All three, however, have higher yields 
Note: Data are based on monitoring and evaluation reports from seven state governments in India; states, years, and seasons as in Table 4 . Figures in parentheses indicate sample size. Sample sizes differ because, for two states, data classified by irrigated and unirrigated farms were not available. The actual number of farmers in the sample is more than 1,500; the sample sizes in the table refer to the number of average yield index figures and hence represent a mean of means.
a. One state, in one cropping season, had an unduly high yield figure, and the sample base was extremely low in relation to the rest and hence was significant in the computation of weighted average yields for all farms. However, in computing the average across unirrigated farms in all states, this number receives equal weighting. Hence, this particular figure should be considered an overestimate.
Source : Feder, Slade, and Sundaram 1986. than those receiving no advice. The figures shown in Table 7 were rigorously tested with econometric techniques, and the conclusions confirmed these results (Feder, Slade, and Sundaram, 1986) . One difficulty with yield comparisons is that no allowance is made for differences in, for example, soil types, farmer attributes, or extent of irrigation, which may also contribute to the variability of yields. We therefore made a deeper analysis, using the farm-level data from the Karnal and Kairana sample surveys.
Although this analysis takes into account certain differences between the two areas, Karnal and Kairana are similar in many respects. They lie on opposite banks of the Jamuna river, are flat, and have light alluvial soils. Average annual rainfall in Karnal is 803 millimeters, and in Kairana 794 millimeters. Both districts are heavily irrigated: in Karnal 74 percent of the net cropped area, in Kairana 84 percent. Linguistically and ethnically, the two are similar. In the dry season, wheat is the dominant crop in both areas. In the rainy season, however, paddy is the main crop in Karnal, sugarcane being less important; in Kairana, it is the other way round.
In the state of Uttar Pradesh, of which Kairana is one of the most western parts, the extension system at the time of the study consisted of the traditional network of village-level workers (VLWs) administered by the Community Development Department. These workers are responsible not only for providing extension advice but also for regulating the supply of inputs and credit and the administration of other subsidy and incentive schemes. They are also the link between the rural population and several other government agencies. In 1981, there were some 140 VLWS in Kairana: one worker for every 6.1 villages. In Karnal the ratio was 4.7. In terms of numbers of people, there was one village worker for every 11,500 rural dwellers in Kairana, and one for every 7,400 in Karnal. In Kairana VLWs are supplemented by staff from the Department of Agriculture, working mainly under the aegis of special crop programs.
Karnal's extension system was reformed in late 1979. The reorganization reduced the ratio of villages to VEWS from an initial 6.05 (similar to the ratio in Kairana at the time of the study) to 4.7. It created new senior positions-for example, supervisors and specialists. VEWS were relieved of nonextension duties. By March 1983, 99 percent of VEW positions and 88 percent of specialist positions (technical specialists of intermediate rank) were filled. However, in May 1982, 25 percent of the positions for agricultural extension officers (supervisors of VEWS) were still vacant. 5 The study included only high yielding varieties of wheat and paddy; traditional varieties are rarely grown in Karnal. Initially, yield differences between the two regions for the two main crops, wheat and paddy, were estimated. These estimates took account of differences in the quantities of variable and fixed inputs, the types of soils, human capital, and irrigation (both quantity and quality). 6 It is thus tempting to assume that any yield differences between Karnal and Kairana in 1983 were wholly attributable to differences in the extension system. However, this need not be true if other systematic (but unobserved) factors differentiated the two areas, or if yield differences had been significant in 1979. To minimize the possibility of misinterpreting the results, the control sample (the non-T&V case) was from that part of Muzaffarnagar district (Kairana Tehsil) next door to Karnal district. Thus, the villages in Kairana's sample were no more than 30 miles from the center of Karnal. Spillover effects were minimal because farmers from the two regions were not regularly in touch with each other.
These precautions could nonetheless fail to account for some fixed and systematic differences between the areas, or possibly for the fact that knowledge spread more rapidly in one of the areas before T&V began. In such cases, even the adjusted yields in 1979 would not be equal, so further adjustments would have to be made. Ideally, what would be needed would be a complete sample for 1979, so that it and the 1982-83 sample could have been subject to detailed econometric analysis. It would then have been possible to test the hypothesis that the 1982-83 residual yield difference was larger than the 1979 difference. Any difference between these two levels would then have been due to T&V extension.
Unfortunately, no such detailed sample from Karnal and Kairana was available for 1979. However, there were some data derived from the seasonal crop-cutting estimates. These data have several deficiencies: (a) the sample sizes for subdistricts are small; (b) they do not differentiate between irrigated and unirrigated conditions or between high yielding and traditional varieties, whereas the 1982-83 data focus only on high yielding varieties under irrigated conditions; (c) they provide no information on inputs or other similar variables that might explain the differences in output; (d) in any one year they include random elements that fluctuate over time, such as disease or bad weather.
To overcome these deficiencies, the data were adjusted to derive mean yields for 1979 that were comparable to the sample used in the detailed analysis of the 1982-83 data. Econometrically estimated relations were used to calculate the residual yield difference between Karnal and Kairana in 1979. This difference was subtracted from the one estimated from the 1982-83 sample, and the increased yield (if any) attributable to T&V extension was calculated on several different assumptions.
The results suggest that in 1982-83, after three years of T&V extension and holding all inputs constant, HYV wheat yields in Karnal were 8.9 percent higher than in Kairana. However, this estimate excludes any difference that existed before the more intensive T&V extension system was introduced. 7 The productivity difference between Karnal and Kairana in 1979 (before the T&V system) was between 1.6 and 3.0 percent; it must be subtracted from the yield difference in 1982-83. The difference in yields, about 7 percent over the first three years of implementation, is attributable to T&V extension. Since Karnal and Kairana were both quite advanced even before T&V-almost all farmers used HYVs and nitrogenous fertilizers-what was the source of this gain in productivity? The study suggests that the gains came partly from the spread of improved production methods, such as the timing of various farm operations. However, farmers and extension agents in the study areas also laid stress on the ability of extension workers to spot local problems, seek help from specialists, and then give farmers the right advice on what to do to minimize yield losses. In areas without a link to expert advice, unforeseen and localized production problems cause bigger losses.
The value of any increase in farm output attributable to T&V Cost-Benefit extension must be set against the additional costs incurred to make Analysis the extra output possible. Although the cost-benefit analysis of T&V in Karnal was made after the fact, a complete series of either costs or benefits for the whole of the project was not available. We were therefore obliged to make several assumptions. To estimate costs, we used Figure 2 data on actual costs incurred during In y the first four years of the T&V system, as well as projections made at the time of project appraisal. These were ad- on the extra yield attributable to T&V Y = yield t=time extension in the third year of the proj-In = natural logarithm ect. However, it is reasonable to expect gains to continue beyond the third year. As there were no data with which to estimate such additional gains, we constructed a dynamic model to simulate later changes in productivity, both with and without T&V (see Figure 2 ). In the absence of T&V extension, the average yield is assumed to grow at a constant rate, while the introduction of T&V initially accelerates that growth by informing farmers of better farming methods and how to use them. Once that phase is over, however, productivity growth will slow down. After a certain number of years (T-'), the average yield will be the same whether or not T&V was implemented. If a T&V project can be stopped as soon as marginal benefits are equal to marginal costs, that would maximize its efficiency.
The model was used to estimate the project's benefits for varying periods. The results show, with a high degree of statistical confidence, that the internal rate of return on a project lasting for T-years exceeds 15 percent; on a project lasting for the most efficient period, it would exceed 20 percent. These calculations, it should be emphasized, refer to incremental costs and benefits. Thus, they reflect the returns to intensifying and improving the extension system, but not its overall return. Theoretically, the overall return could be low while that on incremental investment was high. The data, however, cannot be used to infer the overall return; that would need information on productivity without any extension, which was not available. Knowledge of the overall return would be essential if there was an option to disband the extension system altogether, including those parts that existed before the introduction of T&V. In practice such an option rarely exists, because of bureaucratic rigidities.
Conclusions
This paper has analyzed some key hypotheses about the effects of i&v extension. The results, based on data from India, show that T&V greatly increases the number of contacts between farmers and extension workers, and the proportion of farmers reached increases the longer the T&V system operates. Extension agents were found to be an important source of knowledge about new farming practices, particularly when these practices are complex and expensive. The paper shows that T&V led to significant increases in yields of a major crop in one area covered by a detailed study. Even after allowing for many other factors that help explain differences between farmers' performance, yield differences of about 7 percent over three years remain. When the costs of T&V are set against the value of the increased production, the project produced internal rates of return of at least 15 percent. These benefits seem to be due to improvements in overall farm management rather than to the induced use of more (or new) inputs. More specifically, the results suggest that the greater availability of extension workers and, through them, the advice of specialists substantially improved the ability of farmers to respond to local problems. Moreover, these results pertain to an area where most farmers were already using high yielding varieties and fertilizers before the extension system was reformed. In less advanced areas several studies cited by Herdt and Capule (1983) show that the quality of extension affects farmers' adoption of modern varieties and inputs.
As the results concerning productivity gains come from one of India's more advanced agricultural regions, it might be argued that they do not apply to less advanced areas. Moreover, it has been observed, for example, that profitable innovations spread fast during the green revolution in northwest India without intensive extension work. Nonetheless, the results of this study show that if extension produces even a small gain in one major crop, the extra cost is justified. The review by Herdt and Capule (1983) also cites several studies showing that extension can accelerate the spread of innovations such as high yielding varieties. Thus it seems that the basic elements of new and profitable technology may spread fast naturally, but the spread of more complicated methods and the adaptation of technology to local circumstances will be significantly improved if farmers have access to specific and up-to-date advice. Where there are not enough good and well-organized advisers, extension is likely to be much less effective. Moreover, in areas where appropriate technology
is not yet available, it may be inadvisable to invest in expanding extension services.
This article reviews the rationale for public sector involvement in the dissemination
Abstract
of technological information to farmers, concluding that free markets do not fully satisfy farmers' information needs, and that government support is justified. Agricultural extension is a principal way that governments can disseminate information, and the World Bank is financing many extension projects throughout the developing world.
One specific approach to extension adopted in many Bank extension projects is the Training and Visit (T&V) system. Data from a Bank-sponsored survey in northwest India and from monitoring and evaluation reports issued by several Indian states are used in this article to evaluate T&v extension operations and their impact. Extension agents' interaction with farmers is found to be more intensive and more significant as a source of information in areas covered by T&v extension than in areas with a different extension system. The yield levels of farmers whose main source of information was the T&V extension agent are also shown to be higher. In one case study, the incremental investment in T&V extension is shown to be likely to generate at least a 15 to 20 percent rate of return.
